This paper examines how litigation threats influence sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations. Using the staggered enactment of state-level anti-SLAPP laws, which provide enhanced legal protection for speech on matters of public interest, we study how reductions in litigation risk affect analysts’ behavior and the informativeness of their reports. We find that analysts issue sell or underperform recommendations more frequently after the adoption of broad anti-SLAPP laws. The effect varies in litigation risk exposure across different analyst, brokerage, and firm characteristics. This result is not driven by changes in managerial disclosure behavior resulting from anti-SLAPP enactments. Following anti-SLAPP enactments, sell recommendations become timelier and generate larger short- and long-horizon market reactions, indicating that the recommendations now have higher informational value. Overall, our evidence suggests that litigation threats constrain analysts’ ability to communicate unfavorable information, while stronger legal safeguards enhance their monitoring role and improve information transparency in capital markets.