We examine how political short-termism distorts corporate investment and contributes to the systematic underperformance of Chinese listed firms. Using project-level data from 2003-2020, we find that firms in regions where local officials face stronger GDP growth pressure initiate more projects but experience significant completion delays, creating zombie projects that serve political optics rather than economic value. Effects are stronger when officials are younger, during periods emphasizing GDP performance in promotions, and when officials have greater tenure-based power. Investment distortions are most pronounced for politically vulnerable firms—local SOEs, politically connected companies, and firms in less marketized regions. While zombie projects help firms secure government subsidies and policy loans, they systematically destroy shareholder value and operational efficiency, providing a novel explanation for documented A-share underperformance. Despite harming shareholders, zombie projects serve career interests of both managers (who receive honorary political appointments) and officials (who achieve higher promotion rates through short-term GDP boosts). Our findings reveal how political promotion incentives create investment short-termism structurally different from quarterly earnings pressure in developed markets.