In this study, we examine the relationship between corporate governance quality and financial reporting quality among Chinese A-share listed companies and the role of audit-related arrangements in shaping this relationship. Using a sample of 20,974 firm-year observations from 2015 to 2024, financial reporting quality is measured using accrual-based earnings management proxies derived from the Modified Jones Model. Corporate governance quality is captured by a composite index reflecting board structure and oversight mechanisms, including board size, board independence, audit committee independence, audit committee size, and CEO duality. Firms with stronger overall governance are better able to constrain managerial opportunism and enhance the credibility of financial reporting. The empirical results show that corporate governance quality is negatively and significantly associated with discretionary accruals, indicating higher financial reporting quality. In addition, audit combination moderates this relationship, such that the negative association between corporate governance quality and earnings management becomes weaker, suggesting a substitution effect between internal governance mechanisms and external audit monitoring. Robustness tests using performance-matched discretionary accruals, following Kothari et al. (2005), are used to address potential performance-related bias, with consistent results. Auditor switching is examined as an additional analysis, but the evidence indicates that its moderating effect is limited and non-systematic. The findings highlight the joint role of internal governance and audit structures in shaping financial reporting quality in the Chinese context.