This study investigates whether and how board co-option affects a firm’s labor-related regulatory risk, specifically focusing on wage-related violations. Using Taiwanese listed firms from 2021–2024, a period of intensified enforcement and mandatory disclosure, we conceptualize wage violations as a salient form of nonfinancial regulatory risk revealed primarily through enforcement actions rather than financial statements. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that media-amplified peer labor law enforcement events impose conditional deterrence on management. Specifically, the interaction between board co-option and media salience is negatively and significantly associated with the probability of wage-related infractions. Further analysis reveals that this effect is absent for technical, non-wage violations, which are less reputationally damaging, and that co-opted directors do not respond to peer enforcement events per se in the absence of media coverage. These findings underscore the ‘‘conditional governance’’ role of co-opted boards, identifying media salience as the critical mechanism that activates director oversight in substantive, decentralized operational domains.