Faced with fiscal constraints, many governments provide guarantees in public-private partnerships to incentivise private capital to complement public investment. While such guarantees enhance the creditworthiness of PPP projects, they also expose governments to significant fiscal risks if not properly accounted for and managed, raising concerns about fiscal transparency and accountability. This paper examines how accounting effects fiscal reform through its adjudicating and subjectivizing roles. Focusing on the International Monetary Fund’s efforts to promote fiscal transparency in Brazil, we analyse changes in government reporting of PPP guarantees and contingent liabilities following IMF monitoring. This study contributes to a better understanding of accounting’s roles in governance by demonstrating how supranational adjudication can drive national accounting change without coercive power, and how institutional logics shape a government’s subjectivizing behaviours. The findings have implications for international organisations seeking to foster fiscal transparency and for governments navigating external demands alongside domestic institutional logics.