We examine the role that national whistleblower protection legislation outside the U.S. plays in shaping investor welfare evident in stock price crash risk. Analyzing a sample of firms operating in OECD countries, we find that firms in countries that adopt whistleblower protection legislation suffer an increase in stock price crash risk afterward compared to firms in non-adopting countries. Consistent with expectations, the impact is isolated in countries that pass legislation applying to the corporate sector and specifically designated for whistleblower protection. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the increase in crash risk after whistleblower protection legislation is enacted is magnified for firms that attract less market attention, when alternative monitoring mechanisms are lax, and regulatory enforcement is poor. Additional evidence implies that the future earnings response coefficients (the frequency of negative earnings surprises) of the affected firms fall (rise) post-adoption, suggesting that the flow of information to the market subsides afterward. Collectively, we report results suggesting that whistleblower protection initiatives engender a negative externality by undermining corporate disclosure at the expense of outside investor welfare.